Abstract. The article deals with legal documents in the field of information security, methods of the information risk assessment including economic cost models for identifying probabilistic parameters and structure of information risks and application of these models to the analysis of investments in information security projects. An adequate assessment of information risk and optimization of investments amount in the information security projects are based on approaches and procedures contained in the international standards for managing information security risks. Unfortunately, these standards are largely conceptual and advisory without taking into account of many factors that significantly affect the accuracy and objectivity of risk assessment. Economic approach to the analysis of risks including the known Gordon-Loeb model is focused mainly on the optimal risk management in general without tailoring to the real object producing risks. We offer models that use heuristic motivational and cost mechanisms to determine the parameters and the structure of risks. These models set links between international standards of the analysis and risk assessment and approaches to the risk optimization presented in the Gordon-Loeb model. To ensure a greater compatibility of these models and practical requirements that must be met through their structure, we introduced the information about the psycho-social characteristics of the intruder. Keywords: Information security, standards for managing information security risk, risk assessment methods, research of investing the information security, psych types of intruders.
Introduction
The rapid development of information technology makes it necessary to pay due attention to the information security and its compliance with rapid changes in technology to reduce the likelihood of the risks associated with information threats. Domestic companies, enterprises and institutions usually pay more attention to meet the requirements of normative and methodological framework for information security, defining these requirements as the initial base of information security, which, however, by itself, does not guarantee the reliable protection. An organization can devote significant resources to ensure the stability and sustainability of corporate information systems; but, that does not guarantee even the minimum level of information security. The problem lies in the fact that the design of the information security system must not be focused only on minimizing effects from common threats detected according to certain imaginary external environment of the company but on identifying and minimizing information risks related to practical activities of it. It is a real risk profile tailored to the company's operations and risk neutralization methods that laid leading contemporary concepts of information security systems. Unfortunately, the very essence of the methodology of risk causes some difficulties in its practical use, requiring the calculation of highly accurate information risk assessments and implying exclusive decisions taken by means of it.
In order to get a more or less clear idea of using the methodology of risk in securing information, consider the numerous recommendations and examples of its application described in international standards, national regulations and guidelines on information security.
Results

A SYSTІME OF STANDARDS FOR INFORMATION RISKS ASSESSMENT
The problem of assessment and research of information risks is usually associated with the British Standard BS 7799, especially with its two parts: the first -BS 7799-1 «The best practices for information security management" and the second -BS 7799-2 «Information security management system». It was the first document established the links between information security analysis and information risks. Principles of analyzing and managing risks were introduced in the third part of the standard BS 7799-3 «Guidelines for information security risk management». However, the first international standard for risk management was ISO / IEC TR 13335-3 «Guidelines for the management of IT Security» (1998), which, like other standards of the ISO / IEC 13335series, was recognized as the national standard in Ukraine. Ten years later, in 2008,we were introduced to the standard ISO / IEC 27005 "Information Security Risk Management" having become one of the leading normative documents in the field of information security risk management.
Virtually all modern standards in the field of security reflect common international practices of the risk management. Thus, risk management laid the quality management system of an organization. Standards are clearly conceptual in nature, allowing information security experts to implement any methods, tools, and technology for assessing, processing and managing risks.
The international standards presenting the best practices of large groups of experts and leading organizations are believed to guide best decisions in the case of incidents in the information security. The use of standards increases the value of the information system or technology being created. However, there are no such standards to cover all aspects of management, security and quality.
The evolution of standards in the field of information security risk management can be represented by the following scheme depicted in the Figure 1 .
It is obvious that the evolution means a higher quality level of the new standard through removing mistakes of previous standards and implementing best practices from cross industries. We observe a positive process of replacement of the old IT security standards ISO / IEC TR 13335 with a new series of standards in the Information Security Management -ISO / IEC 27000. The significant influence on the new standard was had by the ISO / IEC 31000 "Risk management. Principles and Guidelines" having been developed simultaneously with the ISO / IEC 2705.The standard ISO / IEC 31000 has compiled the best global practice in risk management. Bibliographic list of the standard covers such standards as ISO / IEC 9001 -General requirements for quality management systems, ISO / IEC 9004 -Recommendations for the sustainable achievement of the quality management system, BS31100 -A set of practical and specific recommendations for the manager of information security, ISO / IEC Guide 73 -A set of terms for risk management, above mentioned AS / NZS 4360 -General requirements for the risk management. All normative documents, which is based on the standard ISO / IEC 31000, are referred to the quality management and control and are applicable to the various fields, including the field of information security.
The generalization of the best cross-industry experience is an added benefit of the ISO / IEC27005, which can be characterized as follows. On the one hand, it has a strong theoretical and practical framework for the security management. On the other, it has the best practices of the quality control and management proven in many areas of application.
Contrary to common expectations, the new standard ISO / IEC27005 is not the international version of BS 7799-3. Moreover, it does not even mention the latter. The structure, content and framework used for the development of these standards significantly differ. Only a general conceptual apparatus and common approach to the risk management remain unchanged.
Thus, the ISO / IEC27005, unlike previous series of standards ISO / IEC27000 including exclusively developments of BSI and other British organizations, has taken fully into account the international experience.
Methodology and recommendations of the above mentioned standards are based on two main approaches top resenting information risk assessments: qualitative and quantitative.
The objective of the qualitative assessments to determine potential risks, the level of severity of threats and factors that affect the level of justification for the various possible counter measures. These techniques do not provide quantitative or monetary value to components and losses. They are quite popular, relatively simple and designed according to the requirements of the international standard ISO / IEC17799:2005.
Quantitative methods provide real and meaningful numerical values of all elements of the risk analysis. These elements include the cost of security measures, the value of assets, losses, the frequency of threat occurrence, the effectiveness of security measures, the likelihood of attacking vulnerable elements and so on.
Quantitative analysis allows obtaining a particular value of the probability of threats. Each element in the analysis is entered as a number in the equation to determine the total and residual risk.
Fig.1. Evolution of Standards for Information Security Risk Management
Also, a combination of these two approaches is often used. The early stages of information risks analysis imply qualitative methods and the final stages including assessments cover quantitative methods.
Given that the qualitative risk assessment does not allow one to compare the cost of information security and its benefits in terms of lower total risks, we will focus on more precise quantitative approach. Then, the development of the information security system (GIS) based on the information risk methodology and fundamental standards could be interfered with some "bottlenecks".
Firstly, risks should be converted into parameters. A widely used equation for calculating the risk of realized threat, Т, is seen as:
where T P -probability of realized threat Т, q -losses due to threat Т, t P -probability of threat occurrence Т, V P -probability of intruder's successful attack on vulnerabilities of the information system leading to the realized threat Т. Therefore, to calculate the risk, one should know two ( q P T , ) or three (
) parameters of the risk T r , defined by experts (Оleksandrovych, Nesterov and Petrenko, 2003) .It leads to the essential quality reduction in risk assessments and, thus, final results of the entire risk management.
Secondly, several threats (vulnerabilities) have partial risks, the cumulative effect of which is described in integrated risk quite difficult to be defined (Arhypov, 2007) .
Thirdly, risk management techniques developed according to the standards, are often based on the selection approach. One considers several options for developing ISS and reduces levels of risks included into the integrated risk to acceptable values. Further, an expert decides what option to select. Perhaps, it will be the least cost-intensive option. However, the quality of the selected ISS and productivity of investments in its implementation are not considered. Replacing an expert by any software does not change the result because it is that expert having been a prototype for the software. So, the most commons of ware is intellectualized information system supporting a decision-making process and being based on methods of displaying and processing knowledge.
An alternative for the risk management based on methods presented in the standards is the use of mathematical models of risk management linking the risk (losses) arising from information threats and investments in the ISS. The use of these models for risk analysis is aimed at evaluating productivity of investments in the ISS and predicting risks dependent on investments in the ISS.
DEVELOPING MODELS FOR INVESTMENTS IN THE INFORMATION SECURITY SYSTEM
Today one of the most widespread models used to analyze the efficiency of investments in ISSs is a model developed by two American researchers in economics Lawrence Gordon and Martin Loebat the University of Maryland (2002) .The model is designed to determine the economically justified investment in information security.
The Gordon-Loeb model reflects a company's decision about how much to invest in the information security. Usually, information security is described with the following indicators: -potential losses through the information leakages, -information vulnerability function returning the probability of the information being stolen, (thus, is a function of broken information security), z -investments in the information security, -information vulnerability as the probability of successful information attacks.
Consider some properties of the function . Authors consider it smooth to employ optimization methods and find out the targeted economic effect. Then, applying to the nature of information risks, they make three important assumptions about the function's properties:
for all . Thus, if the information is absolutely in vulnerable, it stays the same for all investment amounts.
2) For any , . If there are no investments in the information security, then the function of probable information vulnerability will return the probability of this vulnerability.
3) For any and any , and . In case of growing investments in the information security, information becomes more secured; however, the level of security is growing slower than investment amounts. More in detail, authors assume that for all we have , that is heavy investments in the security lead to the reduction of the probability that information will be vulnerable almost to 0.
After analyzing the third assumption, we understand that even small investments in the information security reduce the risk of information leakage.
These assumptions were tested for large amounts of data and confirmed that the model is suitable for application in practice. Also, this model was expanded and empirically checked for Japanese enterprises, data of which were provided by the State Inspectorate guaranteed their reliability.
Authors cite the following formula to determine the investment amount in the information security. Usually the risk-neutral firm will compare the expected bonus of investment with the cost of investing. Expected bonus of investments in the information security (EBIS) is defined as the reduction of potential losses due to additional expenses for security:
EBIS is explained as an indirect profit resulted from investments in the information security. This concept has not been investigated yet. So, accurate description of benefits of investments in the information security is impossible and requires validation.
EBIS (z) is a function of because this is a single variable influenced by a company ( and fixed parameters of information). Expected net income gained from investments in security (ENBIS (z)):
According to the risk terminology, EBIS (z) is a quantitative assessment of reduced initial risk due to investments in the security system. ENBIS (z) is certain criterion comparing reduced risk and investment amount . Thus, equations (2), (3) show economic feasibility of investments in security needed for effective risk management. However, in practice, equations (2)
, (3) quantitative assessments of EBIS(z), ENBIS(z)
require clear structure and parameters of vulnerability function . Gordon and Loeb offered two basic types of functions for vulnerability function . They were widely investigated by foreign and local scientists (Levchenko and Rabchun, 2010) . Unfortunately, the function has been still selected in a subjective way. Numerous articles deal with descriptive and approximate properties of variants of the function. Consider economic and cost models offered by different authors for quantitative assessments of parameters describing information risks.
To define probable risk parameters, these models employ characteristics of motivation and cost, as well as economic and financial relationships present in the situation of informational "attack-defense". Suppose that the intruder A makes threat Тrelated to the informationIowned by the agent В. Then, D -total expenses incurred by А for making the threatТ, g -benefit gained by A in terms of the value of I for A. Losses had by В in terms of the cost of critical information is valued asq. Total cost of security measures used for the information system is с.
These data provide value characteristics of the "attack-defense" situation. On the basis of this information, we can construct a logical and heuristic scheme of the expert evaluation used to calculate information risks.
USE OF ECONOMIC AND COST MODELS FOR ASSESSING RISKS AND PRODUCTIVITY OF INVESTMENTS IN THE INFORMATION SECURITY
Net profit of an intruder in case of successfully inflicted threat Т is:
If the value of the information I for the intruder А is high, then, the intruder A will try to access I very intensively. Besides, ifg>>D, the probability t P of the treat Т infliction will be almost 1, that is the intruder will try all attempts to inflict the harm. Conversely, small values of gimply that economic motives for the threat Т are absent: if either Q=0 or g=D, the informationІis useless for attack. Then,
For g<D the threat Т becomes economically meaning less. Consequently, the probability of activated threatТ can be assessed according to the following equation:
However, the equation (4) does not contain individual motivation characteristics of the intruder. Thus, assessing the probability t P according to the following equation is more suitable:
where motivation ratio γ is introduced. It shows the extent to which the benefitginfluences actions of the intruder А aimed at the activation of the threat Т.
Dependently on the intruder's personal characteristics, the motivation ratio γ can exceed 1 (that tacking side A is hazardous, adventure and confident in success), be less than 1 (the intruder is cautious and not risky). Due to the probability being limited by [0; 1], then the motivation ratio γ exists only if
The feature of the above results is that they are received for a hypothetical attacker, which operates solely on the principle of economic feasibility. This is a typical "intruder-pragmatist". However, other motives for activating the threat T are possible. For example, it can be resentful or vindictive attacker willing to maximize losses q of the owner of information with minimum personal expenses D. Mostly, the cause of such attacker's actions is personal reasons due to misunderstandings or conflict situations encountered in the workplace. Then, the equation (6) 
The above formula (6) and (7) actually reflect some actions cripts for attacker determined by his or her psychological type. Besides, the dominant psychological trait of the attacker, which is there as on for his or her anti social behavior, is assessed with the ratio γ . We can distinguish some classes of the intruder's psych types covering different variants of attacks.
Another factor in the actions of the attacker could be his or her socialization, in particular, professional status. So, we get another common type of attacker taking someone's order. Then, attacking actions to activate the threat T is his or her normal job. Therefore, in this case, the probability of activation of the threat T is
By following the equation (1), the probability of activated threatТ is a result of
where v P -probability of successful attacks by the intruder on the information system ІS containing in formation І. In general, v P -integrated probability of successful attacks through vulnerabilities of the IS including vulnerabilities of the information security system itself. Therefore, the value of the probability v P depends on the level of the IS protection and investment amounts in the information security system (с):
Where s -ratio fluctuating among values practically determined by the relationship between investment amounts in the ISS and critical value of the information for its owner В. Thus, trade secret often has c = (0,05÷0,20)q. For specific data contained in the (Androschuk and Kraynev, 2000) , the low limit is: ≥ s 10÷45. The equation (6) shows that if the IS does not have critical information (that isq=0), then probability v P =0. Ifq>>sc, if there are a great amount of critical information I and low expenses on the ISS resulting into low security level for critical information, probability
Other case simply that Pv differs from 0 and grows if q=const and investment amounts go down.
The equation (8) is used together with (7), (9) for calculating probability T P for an intruder-pragmatist and intruder-avenger. In case of an intruder executing his or her job, the probability of attacks will be (10)
As a rule, the "intruder-executer" is a professional who can rely on additional financial, technical, informational and other resources dependent on the importance of the task. This means the probability of high-cost attacks. In particular, if
.We can expect very high values of probability max v P . The above equations (5) - (11) may be employed for calculating risks and converting them into parameters for particular organization if economic and cost characteristics of the activated threat can be measured. The data for such assessments may be mined through the audit of the information system according to the above listed standards. Static assessments in (5) and (6) can be transformed into dynamic and changing their values in accordance with different economic and costs scenarios of attacks. Besides, equations (5) -(11) allow development of the optimal scheme for assessing productivity of investments in the ISS. Suppose (Arhypov, 2011) 
as well as "profit" will be
(12) The essence of equations (11), (12) is equal to (2), (3). However, unlike the latter, they have "transparent" structure, quantitative parameters of which actually are a combination of risk parameters, and suggest simple procedure of assessments according to the risk management standards. In addition, analysis of the equation (12) as a function of the variable c and its investigation for determining extreme:
allows (Arhypov, 2011) diapason of productive investments: 0<c<q( T P s-1)/s providing the highest R ∆ :
as well as probability v P and risk R for the amount of investments:
Now, with the value of investments eff c , we can consider them as a kind of benchmark in order to adequately invest in information security. By the way, Gordon and Loeb in their studies for a sufficiently general case found that investment in security should not exceed 37% [16] of the total amount of damages. They even say that the investment should be much smaller than shown percent. Note that the economic and cost model "attack -defense" enable a company to verify whether investments in the security system are enough by means of using real data about the company. This is a sufficient distinguish between economic and cost models and Gordon-Loeb model not being able to adjusted to a specific company.
Discussion
The most common methods of analysis and research of information risks set out in international and national standards have a number of flaws including too general conceptual and advisory recommendations, which virtually eliminate the possibility of taking into account the analysis of the characteristics of specific properties of objects and essentially reduce the objectivity and accuracy of the results. In addition, the orientation of new standards for information security ISO 27000 on an iterative procedure of risk management according to Shewhart and Deming makes use of exactly selective approach in developing ISS, narrowing the applicability of analytical optimization techniques.
On the other hand, the use of well-known Gordon-Loeb model to study the problem of efficiency of investment in the security system virtually eliminates the possibility of taking into account the real object of risk and effectively separates this approach from applied research of real objects of risks. Overall GordonLoeb model is not suited for solving applied narrowly specialized tasks
In this situation, it is quite prospective to use for analysis and research of investment and risk methodology based on motivational value and financial and economic characteristics of the situation "attackdefense" through the provision of a number of typical scenarios of development and constructing the corresponding models. To identify the models, we can use data and information obtained according to the rules of international standards. To ensure greater adequacy of these models to the requirements of practical application to their structure, we introduced information about the psycho-social characteristics of the attacker.
